DO EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT INDIVIDUALS USE MORE ADAPTIVE DECISION-MAKING STYLES?

Andreja AVSEC

Department of Psychology, Faculty of Science and Arts, University of Ljubljana Askerceva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia E-mail: andreja.avsec@psiha.net

Abstract: Awareness of emotions, extensive emotional knowledge, and effective emotional management are characteristics of emotionally intelligent individuals. These competencies are expected to enable individuals using more adaptive decision-making styles (DMSs). Specifically, we predicted that trait emotional intelligence (EI) should be a positive predictor of intuitive and rational DMSs and a negative predictor of dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous DMSs, even after controlling for personality. Participants (N = 454) completed Slovene version of the Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire, the Decision-Making Styles Questionnaire, and the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire. Results supported the importance of trait EI on predicting DMSs: after controlling for personality, the trait EI accounted for 1 to 13% of the variance of the DMSs. Higher trait EI was associated with a more frequent use of intuitive, rational, and a less frequent use of dependent and avoidant DMSs. Results are in accordance with the assertion about the positive function of EI.

Key words: trait emotional intelligence, personality, decision-making style

Emotions are essential for sound decisionmaking in a social environment (Damasio, 1994). In everyday life we can frequently observe how emotions influence individual's decision-making, although it is difficult to recognize all of the functions emotions have in decisional processes (Pfister, Boehm, 2008). Possible effects of emotion related abilities and competencies on decision making are probably even harder to recognize, although we argue that these abilities and competences play an important role in making adaptive decisions. For example, the awareness of emotions as one of the basic components of emotional intelligence (EI) enables individuals to incorporate their emotions into deliberations about what to do and what decision to make (Lambie, 2007). The competence to manage and regulate emotions, another important component of EI, can help individuals to decide rationally, considering long term goals in their decisions rather than only momentary and immediate rewards. Making more or less adaptive decisions has important consequences for the individual's functioning and her/his success in life. Therefore, determining the role of EI in using specific decision-making styles (DMSs) could help understand individual differences in decisional processes.

Characteristics of DMSs

Scott and Bruce (1995, p. 820) defined DMS as "the learned habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted with a decision situation". Across the studies, two to nine DMSs could be determined

(e.g., Betsch, 2004; Leykin, DeRubeis, 2010). Scott and Bruce (1995) described five DMSs: the rational DMS is characterized by a comprehensive search for information, inventory of alternatives and logical evaluation of alternatives; the intuitive DMS by attention to details in the flow of information rather than systematic search for and processing of information and a tendency to rely on feelings and premonitions; the dependent DMS by a search for advice and guidance from others before making important decisions; the avoidant DMS by attempts to avoid decision-making whenever possible; and the spontaneous DMS by a sense of immediacy and a desire to make the decision as soon as possible. The rational and intuitive DMSs could be regarded as aspects of a more broad cognitive style, where a common distinction between approaching a task objectively, unemotionally, analytically, thoroughly vs. approaching a task personally, emotionally, holistically, drawing on one's feelings is present (Klaczynski, 2001). A clear theoretical conceptualization is still missing for the avoidant, the dependent, and the spontaneous DMSs.

Because decision-making could yield to more or less adaptive consequences it is of great practical importance to determine which DMSs lead to better decision outcomes than others and can be thus named as adaptive or non-adaptive DMSs. We can determine adaptive DMSs as those that contribute to individual's success in different domains of life, e.g. academic or academic achievement, positive interpersonal relationships, psychological well-being, etc. Although it is hard to determine rational and intuitive DMSs to be adaptive, and dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous DMSs as non-adaptive, some evidence supports this assertion. Studies

have frequently found rational and intuitive DMSs to be associated with positive outcomes: both are negatively related to selfreported negative life events indicative of poor decision making and depressive symptoms (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, Fischhoff, 2007; Leykin, DeRubeis, 2010). But not all correlates are the same for intuitive and rational DMSs. For example, rational DMS is related to higher scores on decision-making competence but intuitive DMS is unrelated to it (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Rational DMS is negatively while intuitive DMS is positively related to innovativeness (Scott, Bruce, 1995) and rational DMS is positively while intuitive DMS is negatively related to social desirability (Thunholm, 2004).

On the other hand, dependent, spontaneous, and avoidant DMSs might be less adaptive as their correlates indicate. Dependent and avoidant DMSs are associated positively with depressive symptoms and negatively to self-esteem (Di Fabio, 2006; Ferrari, 2000; Leykin, DeRubeis, 2010; Thunholm, 2004). Avoidant and spontaneous DMSs were found to be positively related to reported negative life events indicative of poor decision making and negatively to decision-making competence, life satisfaction, and social desirability (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Deniz, 2006; Thunholm, 2004).

This review of studies indicates that rational and intuitive DMSs have the most positive outcomes. The other three DMSs, the dependent, the spontaneous, and the avoidant, have predominantly negative correlates.

Trait EI and DMSs

Many studies have examined and supported the idea of important effects of emotions and emotional intelligence on decisions (e.g., Bar-On et al., 2003; Perez Nieto, Fernandez-Abascal, Miguel-Tobal, 2009; Pilarik, Sarmany-Schuller, 2009) and we can assume that abilities and competencies regarding recognizing, processing, and utilizing emotion-laden information are related to the frequency of using specific DMSs. Trait EI is defined as a "constellation of behavioral dispositions and self-perceptions concerning one's ability to recognize, process, and utilize emotion-laden information" (Petrides, Furnham, 2003, p. 278). Trait EI based on self-reported measures has been criticized as being too subjective and less valid than ability EI (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2008). Nevertheless, people commonly behave according to their thoughts and feelings (Bandura, 1977), so Pervin (1990) encouraged researchers to "...call attention to the person's cognitive activities – the operations and transformations that people perform on information, in contrast to some store of cognitions and responses that a person has" (p. 117). Criticism of the mixed or trait EI models also pertains to arbitrary chosen abilities or traits, comprising the trait EI construct (Mayer et al., 2008). With choosing Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire for our study, we avoided these shortcomings as the questionnaire derives directly from the Mayer and Salovey's (1997) model of EI (Taksić, 2001).

EI and decision-making literature offers some possible theoretical basis for predicting the relationship between trait EI and specific DMSs. Intuitive DMS could be the most closely related to EI since "using intuition versus reason" competence, defined as using emotions in the pursuit of life goals and basing decisions on feelings over logic,

is one of the four utilizations of EI, constituents of EI (Tett, Fox, Wang, 2005). This competence closely resembles intuitive DMS, defined as relying on feelings and hunches when making decisions (Scott, Bruce, 1995). Why would a high EI individual use intuitive DMS more frequently? As Hogarth (2010) argues, intuition is the result of learning and thus high EI individuals can use intuitive DMS more frequently due to broader knowledge regarding emotions. An individual can use intuitive DMS in a specific situation when he/she has enough knowledge about that situation; and since emotions play an important role in many decisions, emotional knowledge can promote the use of intuitive DMS. But the only published study (Laborde, Dosseville, Scelles, 2010) reported no association between trait EI and preference for

Reasoning is often seen as an opposite to emotions but the competence to regulate emotions as one of the components of EI could be positively related to rational DMS. The competence to manage emotions can allow an individual not to decide spontaneously according to momentary emotions but to take them into considerations or not, search for other information, and evaluate possible alternatives, thus allowing for the use of the rational DMS. Similarly, Lambie (2008) argues that although emotions are irrational per se, the awareness of emotions as component of EI can contribute to rational actions. Due to the awareness of emotions, an individual can rationally decide if he/she will act according to his/her emotions or not. Thus, the competence to perceive emotions can also contribute to rational decision-making. Further, we can assume that extensive information about the functioning of individuals' and other people's emotions (one of EI competencies) could reflect person's rational cognitive style. DMS can be regarded as an aspect of a cognitive style and we could predict that the same cognitive style could affect "individual's way of processing information" (Sternberg, Grigorenko, 1997, p. 134) in the area of emotions and in the area of making decisions. Two studies (Di Fabio, Blustein, 2010; Laborde et al., 2010) indeed found a positive relationship between trait EI and rational DMS. On the other hand, Pilarik and Sarmany-Schuller (2011) reported emotional intelligence to be grouped together with neuroticism and low rationality in female medical rescuers.

Predicting the relationship between trait EI and other three DMSs is more difficult. Dependent, avoidant and spontaneous DMSs are regarded as non-adaptive. From the trait EI perspective, adaptive role of EI is not self-evident (Sevdalis, Petrides, Harvey, 2007) but most of the studies report positive relationship between trait EI and adaptive outcomes (e.g., Martins, Ramalho, Morin, 2010). Concerning the relationship with DMSs, Di Fabio and Blustein (2010) found that individuals who rely on the adaptive style of vigilance, which is closely related to rational DMS, tend to demonstrate higher trait EI. On the other hand, they have also found that individuals who relied on non-adaptive decisional conflict styles (avoidance, procrastination, hypervigilance) tend to demonstrate lower levels of trait EI; consequently, these results are in accordance with the view of EI as adaptive competence. On the basis of these results we can predict that trait EI will be negatively related to non-adaptive DMSs.

Personality, Trait EI, and DMSs

One of the most substantial criticisms of the trait EI construct referred to its discriminative validity with regard to personality traits (Matthews, Zeidner, Roberts, 2002). Many studies have actually revealed high correlations between trait EI and personality but not too high to raise doubt about the incremental validity of EI (for review see Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, Pluta, 2005). Individual differences and their effects on decisions were also the focus of many studies (Appelt et al., 2011). Some of them were concerned with the relationship between personality traits and DMSs (DiFabio, 2006; Milgram, Tenne, 2000). The results indicated that personality plays an important role in using specific DMS, thus it is reasonable to control the effect of personality in relationship between EI and DMSs.

In the present research, we have used Zuckerman's Alternative Five Factor Model of Personality (AFFM) for which strong biological-evolutionary basis is characteristic (Zuckerman et al., 1993). The AFFM incorporates five biologically based dimensions of personality. Studies comparing the AFFM and the FFM concluded that there was a high convergence between the two models (e.g., Aluja, Garcia, Garcia, 2002; Zuckerman et al., 1993); neuroticism-anxiety was strongly related to neuroticism, sociability correlated positively with extraversion, impulsive sensation seeking correlated negatively with conscientiousness and aggression-hostility negatively with agreeableness. However, the activity scale is poorly represented in the FFM and conversely, openness to experience is not represented in

AFFM. The AFFM might be valuable in our study for understanding the role of impulsive sensation seeking as basic dimension, which is more relevant to determine the relationship with DMSs than conscientiousness, since many studies of behavioural tests of decision-making examine the role of impulsiveness and sensation-seeking (e.g., Vigil-Colet, 2007) in decisional processes. For example, previous studies found positive association between impulsive or spontaneous DMS and functional and dysfunctional impulsiveness (Ingmar, Franken, Muris, 2005), positive association between intuitive DMS and sensation-seeking, and negative association between rational DMS and sensation-seeking (Baiocco, Laghi, D'Alessio, 2009). A possible advantage of using AFFM in our study is, among other things, the separate basic dimensions of sociability and activity, which are not integrated into a single trait of extraversion as do the FFM.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The aim of this study is to examine the role of trait EI in using specific DMSs. Scarce previous results regarding the association between EI and DMSs are non-consistent, probably due to using different DMS questionnaires. We expected that trait EI is an important predictor of DMSs, since the emotions strongly affect decisional processes and the competences regarding emotions can help an individual to use more adaptive DMSs. We predicted that trait EI should explain the highest percent of variance in intuitive and rational DMSs, which are two most adaptive DMSs; "using intuition versus reason" is one of the core EI compe-tences and higher knowledge of emotions can stimulate using intuitive DMS. On the other hand, we hypothesized that the competence to manage emotions is related to rational DMS, since managing one's own emotions in more or less stressful decisional situations might be a prerequisite to take time for searching more information, possible alternatives and logical evaluation. For dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous DMSs we have no specific predictions, thus in this part our study is exploratory in nature. Because of the criticisms concerning problematic incremental validity of trait EI above personality traits, we used hierarchical regression analyses to control for the effect of personality on DMSs, which was not done in previous studies.

METHOD

Participants

The final sample consisted of 489 Slovene participants (151 males, 338 females). The mean age was 27 years (SD = 8.5; range 17-58 years), 282 of them were students, 179 were employed, the rest were unemployed or selected status "other". We eliminated 9 subjects because they reported that they were less than 17 years old and 34 subjects were eliminated due to unseriousness (the same answers to all questions).

Measures

Emotion Skills and Competence Questionnaire ESCQ-45 (Takšić, 2001) was used to measure trait EI. It consists of 45 items, combined into three scales: 16 items measure the competence to perceive and understand emotions, 13 items measure the

competence to express and label emotions, and the remaining 16 items measure the competence to manage and regulate emotions. The subject's task is to specify to what degree is each item relevant to her/him on a 5-level scale (1 – never, 5 – always). The questionnaire was translated into more than ten languages and shows good reliability and constructive validity (Faria et al., 2006). Alpha coefficients of internal consistency obtained in the present study ranged from .75 to .91.

The General Decision Making Style Questionnaire (GDMS; Scott, Bruce, 1995) measures five different DMSs: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant and spontaneous. It consists of 25 items (5 for each dimension), rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. GDMS scales have shown good psychometric characteristics (Scott, Bruce, 1995; Thunholm, 2004). In our study, alpha coefficients of the scales were above 71.

Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire ZKPQ-50-CC (Aluja et al., 2006) is a shortened 50-item version of the ZKPQ (Zuckerman et al., 1993), measuring the alternative five personality dimensions. It includes five scales, measuring impulsive sensation seeking, neuroticism—anxiety, aggression—hostility, activity, and sociability. In the present study, all but one alpha coefficient were above .72. For neuroticism-anxiety alpha was .61.

Procedure

Participants filled out questionnaires on the website. An invitation with a link to the questionnaires was passed through e-mails of psychology students who were asked not to participate themselves but to forward the link to their friends, acquaintances, relatives etc. After completing the questionnaire, participants immediately received their results with a short interpretation.

RESULTS

The correlation matrix for all variables is presented in Table 1. Correlations between DMSs and personality traits were low and approximately half of them did not reach the level of statistical significance. Correlations between trait EI and DMS were higher; all five DMSs were importantly related to at least one aspect of trait EI.

The results of the five hierarchical multiple regressions for the five DMSs are presented in Table 2. Gender and age were entered simultaneously in the first step to control for possible effects. In the second step, five alternative personality factors were entered and in the third step, three scales of the trait EI were added into the model.

Gender was found to account for significant though small amount of variance in intuitive and dependent DMSs. Both styles were more frequently used by females. Age was an important predictor only for the dependent DMS: the older individuals reported seeking advice and relying on others before making decisions more frequently than the younger ones. In the second step, five personality traits were entered into regression simultaneously. All five personality traits jointly explained from 4 to 12% of variance in DMSs. Personality explained the largest part of variance in the avoidant DMS due to the large effect of neuroticism- anxiety. Intuitive and dependent DMSs were the least related to personality dispositions.

In the third step, three scales of trait EI were added into regressions simultaneously and accounted for 1 to 13% of variance over and above gender, age, and personality. All three scales of trait EI accounted for a significant amount of variance in the intuitive DMS and explained together additional 13% of variance. For other DMSs, trait EI was much less important. The competence to manage and regulate emotions contributed

to a more frequent use of rational, dependent, and spontaneous DMS. The competence to perceive and understand emotions predicted a lower use of the dependent DMS and the competence to express and label emotions predicted a lower use of the avoidant DMS. In general, the results are in accordance with our expectrations about the importance of trait EI for DMSs, after controlling for personality as well.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations among study variables

		M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	N-Anx	4.3	3.0												
2	ImpSS	5.5	2.6	06											
3	Act	5.0	2.8	11 *	.12										
4	Sy	4.5	2.6	25 **	.34	.06									
5	Agg-Host	3.8	2.0	.23	.21	08	.09								
6	PU	59.2	8.2	12 **	.16 **	.13	.20	03							
7	EL	47.3	7.6	17 **	.05	.13	.23	.06	.57 **						
8	MR	59.2	6.4	38 **	.21	.27 **	.28	07	.40 **	.43					
9	Rational DMS	18.9	2.7	11 *	07	.25 **	02	08	.21	.20	.29 **				
10	Intuitive DMS	18.3	2.6	.01	.15 **	.12	.15 **	.11	.36 **	.35	.30 **	.02			
11	Dependent DMS	17.3	3.2	.20 **	05	01	.01	.01	13 **	05	.00	.10	.03		
12	Avoidant DMS	14.1	3.8	.31	.03	14 **	11 *	.08	15 **	26 **	20 **	16 **	.05	.31	
13	Spontaneous DMS	14.1	2.9	03	.22	.03	.19 **	.22	.19 **	.20 **	.24	34 **	.37 **	13	.05

Note: PU - Perceive and Understand Emotions; EL - Express and Label Emotions; MR - Manage and Regulate Emotions; ImpSS - Impulsive Sensation Seeking; N-Anx - Neuroticism-Anxiety; Agg-Host - Aggression-Hostility; Act - Activity; Sy - Sociability

^{*} p < .05; ** p < .01

Table 2. Summary results of hierarchical regression analysis of DMSs on three scales of trait EI, controlled for gender, age (Step 1) and the alternative five (Step 2)

Step		Rational		Intuitive		Dependent		Avoidant		Spontaneous	
	Predictor	β	ΔR^2	β	ΔR^2	β	ΔR^2	β	ΔR^2	β	ΔR^2
1			.01		.02*		.03**		.00		.00
	Gender	06		.12*		.12*		.02		03	
	Age	07		02		14*		05		.04	
2			.08**		.06**		.04**		.11**		.11**
	Gender	04		.16**		.07		02		.01	
	Age	10*		.04		14**		04		.13**	
	N-Anx	09		00		.21**		.29**		02	
	ImpSS	12*		.11*		08		.08		.16**	
	Act	.24**		.13**		.02		09		.02	
	Sy	03		.10*		.07		12**		.14**	
	Agg-Host	03		.11*		04		01		.20**	
3			.09**		.13**		.03**		.04**		.05**
	Gender	10*		.07		.09		.03		03	
	Age	13**		01		14**		.02		.12*	
	N-Anx	.00		.10*		.24**		.26**		.06	
	ImpSS	16**		.06		07		.08		.13**	
	Act	.17**		.05		.01		09*		04	
	Sy	10*		.02		.06		02		.10*	
	Agg-Host	04		.09*		05		.02		.19**	
	PU	.10		.19**		20**		01		.07	
	EL	.11		.16**		.05		22**		.04	
	MR	.16**		.17**		.14*		.01		.19**	
	Total		.18		.21	Г	.10	1.5	.15		.16

Note: PU - Perceive and Understand Emotions; EL - Express and Label Emotions; MR - Manage and Regulate Emotions; ImpSS - Impulsive Sensation Seeking, N-Anx - Neuroticism-Anxiety; Agg-Host - Aggression-Hostility; Act - Activity; Sy - Sociability

* p < .05; ** p < .01

DISCUSSION

The present findings support the idea that individual differences in DMSs can be partly explained by individual differences in personality and trait EI. After controlling for personality, trait EI explained up to 13% of variance in DMSs. It contributed positively to intuitive, rational and spontaneous DMSs,

and negatively to dependent and avoidant DMSs.

Personality explained an important number of individual differences in DMSs. Although 4 to 11% of explained variance does not represent a large effect size, these findings support previous data (Betsch, 2004; DiFabio, 2006; Milgram, Tenne, 2000) and our everyday experiences that individuals are inclined to use specific DMSs due to their

personality dispositions more frequently. At least one aspect of trait EI was an important predictor of each DMS even after controlling for personality, providing evidence for the expected incremental validity of trait EI. Trait EI was the strongest predictor of intuitive DMS. Individuals with higher self-ratings on all three scales of trait EI make decisions intuitively more frequently. They apply "using intuition versus reason" competence also when making decisions, thus using the intuitive DMS more frequently. These results are in accordance with our prediction but not with the previous results (Laborde et al., 2010), where no association was found between trait EI and intuitive preference for intuition. Different measures were used for both constructs, which could be the reason for these inconsistent results.

Our results also corroborate our expectations about the positive relationship between trait EI and rational DMS. The competence to manage and regulate emotions predicts a more frequent use of the rational DMS. This competence can allow individuals not to decide based only on their momentary emotions, but to take them into considerations, to search for other information, and to evaluate possible alternatives, thus allowing the use of the rational DMS. Laborde and co-workers (2010) reported similar results: they found a positive correlation between trait EI and preference for deliberation as a decision-making strategy. Other two scales of trait EI did not reach statistical significance as predictors of rational DMS but the correlations among them are positive and statistically important, thus showing the importance of all three scales of trait EI for rational DMS.

The obtained results also show that individuals, who are more competent in dealing

with emotions, use dependent and avoidant DMSs less frequently. They procrastinate less in decisions and less frequently rely on others, possibly because they are more selfconfident on the area of emotions, which is relevant in many decisional processes. On the other hand, the competence to manage emotions is positively related to dependent DMS. These, at first sight contradicting results, might be explained by the culture dimension of collectivism-individualism. Although dependent DMS is regarded as nonadaptive DMS due to individuals' unwillingness to take responsibility for their decisions, in collectivistic cultures individuals must take into considerations other opinions as well when making decisions. Individuals who are capable to manage and regulate their own and other people's emotions can apply dependent DMS more successfully, consequently and also more frequently, since this emotional competence is of central importance for social adaptation (Engelberg, Sjöberg, 2005). Slovenia was found to be a relatively collectivistic culture (Hofstede, 2001), thus this association is present, while it might not be the case in more individualistic cultures.

Trait EI also emerged as an important predictor of spontaneous DMS: the higher competence to manage and regulate emotions predicted more frequent use of spontaneous DMS, which is contrary to our expectations. Immediate decisions of spontaneous decision-makers implicitly suggest the inability to wait for collecting relevant information and to control momentary emotions. On the other hand, the positive association between trait EI and spontaneous DMS is similar to the association of intuitive DMS and trait EI and thus in accordance with Thunholm's (2004) idea that spontaneous DMS is regarded as

a quick variant of intuitive DMS. Maybe spontaneous DMS should not be regarded as an extremely non-adaptive DMS. This possibility is supported by our results, since spontaneous DMS is not related to neuroticism-anxiety, so impulsive decisions are not due to lower frustration tolerance.

Overall, our study showed that both personality and trait EI have an important predictive power in explaining the frequency of specific DMSs. Trait EI showed an important incremental validity over personality. Although rational and intuitive DMSs are regarded as opposite styles of decisions making, the function of trait EI for these two styles is similar. Individuals with high trait EI apply intuitive DMS and rational DMS more frequently, both regarded as highly adaptive DMSs. As the name indicates, EI incorporates two opposite constructs - hot emotions and cold intelligence. And this joint construct has a similar function in two, rather opposite constructs of decision making - rational and intuitive DMSs.

As Thunholm (2004) mentioned, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous DMSs do not have solid theoretical bases and this study contributed to the understanding of their construct validity. The non-adaptive nature of avoidant DMS is supported by substantial amount of data and our results are in accordance with these data. Dependent DMS is present in much fewer questionnaires so previous results about its adaptability are scarce. Our data indicates that the dependent DMS, measured by DMSQ might incorporate two possible motivations for such style: avoidance of responsibility or following cultural norms. More cross-cultural data is needed for confirmation of this assumption. For spontaneous DMS, clear distinction from intuitive DMS is

problematic and its adaptability should be more clearly determined.

Among the limits of our study, the characteristics of the participants should be noted. The sample might not be representative of the Slovene population, especially for the population above the age of 50, since the data for this study were collected via the Internet. Another limit of our study might be offering feedback to respondents, because for this reason the sample is selected on the basis of self-understanding motive. Generalizability of our findings across cultures is also limited. Even though the structural validity of the questionnaire ESCQ used for measuring trait EI was confirmed crossculturally, some culture specifics regarding the role of managing emotions in making decisions could exist. Another limitation of this study is the use of solely self-reported measure of EI. Although trait EI approach offers an important insight into functioning of individuals, an ability EI approach would offer an additional insight into the role of EI in decisional processes.

Received November 22, 2011

REFERENCES

ALUJA, A., GARCIA, O., GARCIA, L.F., 2002, A comparative study of Zuckerman's three structural models for personality through the NEO-PI-R, ZKPQ-III-R, EPQ-RS and Goldberg's 50-bi-polar adjectives. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 33, 713-725.

ALUJA, A., ROSSIER, J., GARCIA, L.F., ANGLEITNER, A., KUHLMAN, M., ZUCKER-MAN, M., 2006, A cross-cultural shortened form of the ZKPQ (ZKPQ-50-CC) adapted to English, French, German and Spanish languages. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 41, 619-628.

APPELT, K.C., MILCH, K.F., HANDGRAAF, M.J.J., WEBER, E.U., 2011, The decision making individual differences inventory and guidelines for

the study of individual differences in judgment and decision-making research. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 6, 252-262.

BAIOCCO, R., LAGHI, F., D'ALESSIO, M., 2009, Decision-making style among adolescents: Relationship with sensation seeking and locus of control. *Journal of Adolescence*, 32, 963-976.

BANDURA, A., 1977, Self-efficacy: Toward a unified theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, 84, 191-215.

BAR-ON, R., TRANEL, D., DENBURG, N.L., BECHARA, A., 2003, Exploring the neurological substrate of emotional and social intelligence. *Brain*, 126, 1790-1800.

BETSCH, C., 2004, Preference for intuition and deliberation (PID): An inventory for assessing affect- and cognition-based decision-making. Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 25, 179-197.

BRUINE DE BRUIN, W., PARKER, A.M., FISCHHOFF, B., 2007, Individual differences in adult decision-making competence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92, 938-956.

DAMASIO, A.R., 1994, Descartes error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. London: Macmillan.

DENIZ, M.E., 2006, The relationships among coping with stress, life satisfaction, decision-making styles and decision self-esteem: An investigation with Turkish university students. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 34, 1161-1170.

DI FABIO, A., 2006, Decisional procrastination correlates: Personality traits, self-esteem or perception of cognitive failure? *International Journal for Educational and Vocational Guidance*, 6, 109-122.

DI FABIO, A., BLUSTEIN, D.L., 2010, Emotional intelligence and decisional conflict styles: Some empirical evidence among Italian high school students. *Journal of Career Assessment*, 18, 71-81.

ENGELBERG, E., SJOBERG, L., 2005, Emotional intelligence and inter-personal skills. In: R. Schulze, R.D. Roberts (Eds.), *Emotional intelligence: An international handbook* (pp. 289-307). Ashland, OH, US: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers, US.

FARIA, L.M.S., SANTOS, N.L., TAKSIC, V., RATY, H., MOLANDER, B., HOLMSTROM, S., et al., 2006, Cross-cultural validation of the Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire (ESCQ). *Psicologia*, 30, 95-127.

FERRARI, J.R., 2000, Procrastination and attention: Factor analysis of attention deficit, boredomness, intelligence, self-esteem and task de-

lay frequencies. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 15, 185-196.

INGMAR, H.A., FRANKEN, I.H.A., MURIS, P., 2005, Individual differences in decision-making. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 39, 991-

HOFSTEDE, G., 2001, Culture's consequences, comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.

HOGARTH, R.M., 2010, Intuition: A challenge for psychological research on decision making. *Psychological Inquiry*, 21, 338-353.

KLACZYNSKI, P.A., 2001, Analytic and heuristic processing influences on adolescent reasoning and decision-making. *Child Development*, 72, 844-861

LABORDE, S., DOSSEVILLE, F., SCELLES, N., 2010, Trait emotional intelligence and preference for intuition and deliberation: Respective influence on academic performance. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 49, 784-788.

LAMBIE, J.A., 2008, On irrationality of emotion and the rationality of awareness. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 17, 946-971.

LEYKIN, Y., DERUBEIS, R.J., 2010, Decision-making styles and depressive symptomatology: Development of the Decision Styles Questionnaire. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 5, 506-515.

MARTINS, A., RAMALHO, N., MORIN, E., 2010, A comprehensive meta-analysis of the relationship between emotional intelligence and health. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 49, 554-564.

MATTHEWS, G., ZEIDNER, M., ROBERTS, R.D., 2002, *Emotional intelligence: Science & myth.* Cambridge: The MIT Press.

MAYER, J.D., SALOVEY, P., 1997, What is emotional intelligence? In: P. Salovey, D. Sluyter (Eds.), Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Implications for educators (pp. 3-31). New York: Basic Books.

MAYER, J.D., SALOVEY, P., CARUSO, D.R., 2008, Emotional intelligence: New ability or eclectic traits? *American Psychologist*, 63, 503-517.

MILGRAM, N.N., TENNE, R., 2000, Personality correlates of decisional and task avoidant procrastination. *European Journal of Personality*, 14, 141-156.

PEREZ NIETO, M.A., FERNANDEZ-ABASCAL, E.G., MIGUEL-TOBAL, J.J., 2009, The role of emotions in decision-making. *Studia Psychologica*, 51, 305-318.

PERVIN, L.A., 1990, Handbook of personality: Theory and research. New York: Guilford Press.

PETRIDES, K.V., FURNHAM, A., 2003, Trait emotional intelligence: Behavioural validation in two studies of emotion recognition and reactivity to mood induction. *European Journal of Personality*, 17, 39-57.

PFISTER, H.R., BOEHM, G., 2008, The multiplicity of emotions: A framework of emotional functions in decision making. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 3, 5-17.

PILARIK, L., SARMANY-SCHULLER, I., 2009, Emotional intelligence and decision-making of female students of social work in the Iowa Gambling Task. *Studia Psychologica*, 4, 319-329.

PILARIK, L., SARMANY-SCHULLER, I., 2011, Personality predictors of decision-making of medical rescuers. *Studia Psychologica*, 5, 175-184.

SCOTT, S.G., BRUCE, R.A., 1995, Decision-making style: The development and assessment of a new measure. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 55, 818–831.

SEVDALIS, N., PETRIDES, K.V., HARVEY, N., 2007, Predicting and experiencing decision-related emotions: Does trait emotional intelligence matter? *Personality and Individual Differences*, 42, 1347-1358.

STERNBERG, R.J., GRIGORENKO, E.L., 1997, Are cognitive styles still in style? *American Psychologist*, 52, 700-712.

TAKŠIĆ, V., 2001, Upitnici emocionalne kompetentnosti (inteligencije) [Emotional competence (intelligence) questionnaires]. In: K. Lacković-Grgin, Z. Penezić (Eds.), Zbirka psihologijskih mjernih instrumenata [The collection of psychological instruments]. Zadar: Faculty of Philosophy in Zadar, Croatia.

TETT, R.P., FOX, K.E., WANG, A., 2005, Development and validation of a self-report measure of emotional intelligence as a multidimensional trait domain. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31, 859-888.

THUNHOLM, P., 2004, Decision-making style: Habit, style or both? *Personality and Individual Differences*, 36, 931-944.

VAN ROOY, D.L., VISWESVARAN, C., PLUTA, P., 2005, An evaluation of construct validity: What is this thing called emotional intelligence? *Human Performance*, 18, 445-462.

VIGIL-COLET, A., 2007, Impulsivity and decision making in the balloon analogue risk-taking task. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 43, 37-45.

ZUCKERMAN, M., KUHLMAN, D.M., TETA, P., JOIREMAN, J., KRAFT, M., 1993, A comparison of three structural models of personality: The big three, the big five, and the alternative five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65, 757-768.

POUŽÍVAJÚ EMOČNE INTELIGENTNÍ JEDINCI VIAC ADAPTÍVNYCH ŠTÝLOV ROZHODOVANIA?

A. A v s e c

Súhrn: Jedincov s vyššou emočnou inteligenciou charakterizuje uvedomovanie si emócií, rozsiahle emočné vedomosti a efektívny emočný manažment. Očakáva sa, že tieto kompetencie jedincom umožňujú používať viac adaptívnych štýlov rozhodovania. Predpokladali sme najmä, že emočná inteligencia (EI) ako črta by mala byť pozitívnym prediktorom intuitívnych a racionálnych štýlov rozhodovania a negatívnym prediktorom závislých, vyhýbacích a spontánnych štýlov rozhodovania aj keď kontrolujeme osobnosť. Respondentom (N = 454) sme administrovali slovinskú verziu Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire, Decision-Making Styles Questionnaire a Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire. Výsledky potvrdili dôležitosť EI ako črty pre predikcii štýlov rozhodovania: po kontrolovaní osobnosti viedla EI ako črta k 1 až 13% variancie štýlov rozhodovania. Vyššia EI ako črta sa spájala s častejším použitím intuitívneho, racionálneho a zriedkavejším použitím závislého a vyhýbacieho štýlu rozhodovania. Výsledky sa zhodujú s tvrdeniami o pozitívnej funkcii EI.